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Abstract: This paper considers the remote state estimation in a cyber-physical system (CPS)
using multiple sensors. The measurements of each sensor are transmitted to a remote estimator
over a shared channel, where simultaneous transmissions from other sensors are regarded
as interference signals. In such a competitive environment, each sensor needs to choose its
transmission power for sending data packets taking into account of other sensors’ behavior.
To model this interactive decision-making process among the sensors, we introduce a multi-
player non-cooperative game framework. To overcome the inefficiency arising from the Nash
equilibrium (NE) solution, we propose a correlation policy, along with the notion of correlation
equilibrium (CE). An analytical comparison of the game value between the NE and the CE
is provided, with/without the power expenditure constraints for each sensor. Also, numerical
simulations demonstrate the comparison results.
1. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs), which combine the tradi-
tional control system with information and communication
technologies, can provide great improvements in the sys-
tem performance, including the robustness to unexpected
disturbance and efficient utilization of resources, see Kim
and Kumar (2012). As the next generation control sys-
tems, CPSs have attracted increasing interest in different
realms, such as the smart grid, intelligent transportation,
ubiquitous health care, and so on.
The incorporation of communication networks although
provides stability and efficiency for physical systems, un-
fortunately raises a number of technical challenges in the
control system design. For example, when we consider
remote state estimation using multiple sensors, if the
communication bandwidth is limited and cannot allow all
sensors to transmit data, then simultaneous data trans-
mission will lead to signal interference which will further
lead to packet drop and hence deteriorate the estimation
performance. There are several representative methods for
interference management in communication theory, such
as code division multiple access (CDMA), see Tse and
Viswanath (2005). However, there lack efficient approaches
to cope with the multi-access issue in the remote state
estimation. Another factor to consider is the limited sensor
energy budget. As most sensor nodes use on-board batter-
ies, which are difficult to replace or recharge, the energy for
sensing, computation and transmission is restricted. Moti-
vated by this, a considerable amount of literature has been
published on sensor transmission scheduling to achieve
?
accurate estimation under limited energy constraints, e.g.,
Shi et al. (2011); Ren et al. (2014). However, many of
them focus on the one-sensor case and model the sensor
scheduling as a Markov decision problem (MDP). The
problem becomes difficult when taking multiple sensors
into account. In this work, we provide quantitative anal-
ysis of transmission competition over a shared channel
for remote estimation under abundant energy and limited
energy,respectively.
In communication theory, the traditional way to solve the
competition problem is to model it as a non-cooperative
game (see Alpcan et al. (2001); Koskie and Gajic (2005);
Machado and Tekinay (2008); Sengupta et al. (2010)).
Precisely, the sensors are treated as selfish players aiming
at maximizing their utilities such as their own throughput
or certain thresholds of signal-to-noise-ratio, and the Nash
equilibrium (NE) concept provides the optimal strategy for
each player. Different from these preliminary works, our
work focuses on dynamic systems and considers the state
estimation performance. Since the sensors have different
time-varying objective functions, more thorough analysis
of the NE solution is required, as demonstrated in Li et al.
(2014). Unfortunately, the obtained NE in Li et al. (2014)
leads to an inefficient outcome, called “tragedy of the
commons”. To overcome these limitations, we introduce
the notion of correlated equilibrium (CE), along with a
correlation mechanism, and analyze its impact on the state
estimation performance.
As proposed by Aumann (1974), the CE is a generalization
of the NE concept to capture the strategic correlation
opportunities that the players face. More importantly, it
allows an increase in all players’ profits simultaneously.
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The definition of CE includes an arbitrator who can send
(private or public) signals to the players. Remarkably,
this arbitrator requires no intelligence or any knowledge
of the system, which is different from centralized man-
agement (where everyone obeys some rules provided by
the mediator). Therefore, the generated signal does not
depend on the system states; for example, see Han (2012),
the surrounding weather conditions or the thermal noises
for communication channels. Unlike the cooperative game,
each player is self-enforced to comply with the outcome
suggested by the mediator, rather than being restricted by
a contract. In conclusion, the CE concept not only provides
a tractable solution for this competition problem, but also
may bring more benefits to each player than the NE.
By the employment of the CE concept, we investigate
the optimal transmission strategies for the sensors in a
large-scale CPS with shared public resources. Compared
with the previous work by Li et al. (2014), not only is
the performance difference between CE and NE studied,
but the respective power constraint for each sensor is also
considered. The main contributions of our current work
are summarized as follows:
• We provide a general game-theoretic framework for
remote state estimation in a multi-access system,
where the sensors compete over access to the same
channel for packet transmission.
• In the absence of power restrictions, we analyze
the existence and uniqueness of NE for this game.
That is, at the NE, each sensor transmits with its
maximum energy level. Moreover, the CE is proved
to be equivalent to the NE.
• With energy limitations, we formulate the problem
as a constrained game and provide the closed-form
NE. Moreover, after proposing an easy-to-implement
correlation mechanism, we obtain the explicit rep-
resentation of the CE. By comparison, the CE is
preferable to the NE for this game.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Mathe-
matical models of the system are described in Section 2. In
Section 3, we introduce the multi-player non-cooperative
game and give the definition of CE. Section 4 demon-
strates the main theoretical results with/without power
constraints. The correlation policy is also introduced in
Section 4, and the simulation results are shown in Section
5. Some concluding remarks are given in the end.
Notations: Z is the set of non-negative integers. N is the
set of positive integers. k ∈ Z is the time index. Rn is
the n dimensional Euclidean space. Sn+ is the set of n by n
positive semi-definite matrices. When X ∈ Sn+, it is written
as X ≥ 0. X ≥ Y if X − Y ∈ Sn+. E[·] is the expectation
of a random variable and Tr(·) is the trace of a matrix.
For functions f, f1, f2 : Sn+ → Sn+, f1 ◦ f2 is defined as
f1 ◦ f2(X) , f1
(
f2(X)
)
. 1(·) is the indicator function.
∆(·) represents a set of probability measures and “w.p.”
means with probability.
2. PROBLEM SETUP
As depicted in Fig. 1, the state information of different
processes is sent to the remote estimator through one
Fig. 1. System Architecture.
shared channel, and essential components of the overall
system structure will be introduced in this section.
2.1 Local Kalman Filter
Consider the following network system containing one
remote estimator and N sensors, which separately monitor
different linear systems:
xi(k + 1) =Aixi(k) + wi(k), (1)
yi(k) =Cixi(k) + vi(k), i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (2)
where at time k, the state vector of the system measured
by sensor i is xi(k) ∈ Rnx , and the obtained noisy mea-
surement is yi(k) ∈ Rmy . For each process i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
the process noise wi(k) ∈ Rnx and the measurement
noise vi(k) ∈ Rmy are zero-mean i.i.d. Gaussian ran-
dom variables with E[wi(k)wi(j)′] = δkjQi (Qi ≥ 0),
E[vi(k)vi(j)′] = δkjRi (Ri > 0), and E[wi(k)vi(j)′] =
0 ∀j, k. The initial state xi(0) is a zero-mean Gaussian
random vector with covariance Σi(0) ≥ 0, and it is un-
correlated with wi(k) and vi(k). The time-invariant pair
(Ai, Ci) is assumed to be detectable and (Ai,
√
Qi) is
stabilizable.
Here, we adopt “smart” sensors to improve the estima-
tion/control performance of the current system. As illus-
trated in Hovareshti et al. (2007), the so-called “smart”
sensors, equipped with memory and the embedded opera-
tors, are capable of processing the collected data. In Fig. 1,
by running a Kalman filter locally, sensor i can compute
the optimal estimate of the corresponding state xi(k)
based on the collected measurements {yi(1), . . . , yi(k)}.
The obtained minimum mean-squared error (MMSE) es-
timate of the process state is given by
xˆsi (k) = E[xi(k)|yi(1), . . . , yi(k)].
The corresponding estimation error covariance is denoted
as:
P si (k) , E[(xi(k)− xˆsi (k))(xi(k)− xˆsi (k))′|yi(1), . . . , yi(k)].
These terms are computed recursively following the stan-
dard Kalman filter equations:
xˆsi (k|k − 1) =Aixˆsi (k − 1),
Pi(k|k − 1)s =AiP si (k − 1)A′i +Qi,
Ki(k) = P
s
i (k|k − 1)C ′i[CiP si (k|k − 1)C ′i +Ri]−1,
xˆsi (k) =Aixˆ
s
i (k − 1) +Ki(k)yi(k)− CiAixˆsi (k − 1),
P si (k) = (I −Ki(k)Ci)P si (k|k − 1).
The iteration starts from xˆsi0 = 0 and P
s
i (0) = Σi(0). For
notational simplicity, we define the Lyapunov and Riccati
operators hi(·) and g˜i(·) : Sn+ → Sn+ as
hi(X) , AiXA′i +Qi,
g˜i(X) , X −XC ′i[CiXC ′i +Ri]−1CiX.
Suppose that the time-invariant pair (A,C) is detectable
and (A,
√
Q) is stabilizable, the estimation error covariance
P sk converges exponentially to a unique fixed point P i
of hi ◦ g˜i according to Anderson and Moore (1979). For
brevity, we ignore the transient periods and assume that
the Kalman filter at the sensor has entered steady state;
i.e.,
P si (k) = P i, k ≥ 1. (3)
As mentioned in Shi et al. (2011), the steady-state error
covariance P i has the following property.
Lemma 2.1. For 0 ≤ t1 < t2, the following inequality
holds:
Tr[P i] ≤ Tr[ht1i (P i)] < Tr[ht2i (P i)]. (4)
2.2 Communication Model
As demonstrated in Fig. 1, the sensor i will transmit the
local estimate xˆsi (k) as a packet to the remote estimator
through a single channel, which may be occupied by other
sensors. Hence, this information delivery interferes directly
with other transmissions of the sensors that use the same
channel, hence, the estimation of state xi(k) is affected.
In this multi-access system, we assume that the shared
channel has independent Additive White Gaussian Noise
(AWGN). By modeling the signals of other sensors as
interfering noises, the channel quality, as measured by the
signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) in point-to-point communica-
tion, is closely related to the revised signal-to-interference-
and-noise-ratio (SINR), see Tse and Viswanath (2005). For
sensor i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, its SINR is defined as:
γi(k) = L
hiai(k)∑
j 6=i hjaj(k) + σ2
= L
qi(k)
qˆ−i(k) + σ2
, (5)
in which ai(k) ≥ 0 and aj(k) ≥ 0 correspond to the
transmission power taken by sensor i and sensor j, re-
spectively. For simplicity, we define qi(k) , hiai(k) and
qˆ−i(k) ,
∑N
j=1,j 6=i qj(k). The extra term
∑
j 6=i hjaj(k) in
the denominator of (5) is due to the interference from the
other sensors, and σ2 is the channel noise. The parameter
hi ∈ (0, 1),∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is the channel gain from sensor
i to the remote estimator, and L is the spreading gain
of the communication system. These channel parameters
are assumed to be time-invariant 1 . Moreover, they can
be acquired by the sensors, as the sensors can access the
channel state information (CSI) using pilot-aided channel
estimation techniques.
To characterize the packet-dropout for sensor i, we intro-
duce the notation symbol error rate (SER) and adopt a
general function to represent the relationship between SER
and SINR:
SERi , f(γi), ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , N},
where f(·) depends on the channel characteristic and
the modulation schemes. Note that since the interference
takes great importance in the multi-access system, the
packet transmission typically operates at low SINRs. As
investigated by Loyka et al. (2010), the error probability
function f(·) is strictly concave and decreasing in γi.
Here, we consider an erasure channel that the packet
will be dropped if it contains any error (in general, the
1 Time-variety has little effect on the results afterwards.
symbol error can be detected by the channel coding
method). Therefore, the simultaneous transmissions of
this system are characterized by independent Bernoulli
processes, denoted by ηi(k). Let ηi(k) = 0 denotes the
loss of packet xˆsi (k), and ηi(k) = 1 otherwise. Hence, we
have
Pr(ηi(k) = 1) = 1− f(γi), ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , N}.
Note that, the arrival of packet xˆsi (k) not only depends on
the transmission power of sensor i, but also is affected by
the behaviors of the other sensors.
2.3 Remote State Estimation
Let xˆi(k) denote the MMSE estimate of the process xi(k)
generated by the remote estimator, with the error covari-
ance matrix Pi(k). Similar to Shi et al. (2011), the estima-
tion process is as follows: if xˆsi (k) arrives successfully, the
estimator synchronizes its respective estimate xˆi(k) with
it; otherwise, the estimator simply predicts the estimate
based on its previous estimate and system dynamics. In
short, the estimation xˆi(k) is denoted by
xˆi(k) = ηi(k)xˆ
s
i (k) + (1− ηi(k))Aixˆi(k − 1).
Similarly, the simple recursion of the error covariance Pi(k)
is
Pi(k),E[(xi(k)− xˆi(k))(xi(k)− xˆi(k))′]
= ηi(k)P i + (1− ηi(k))hi(Pi(k − 1)), (6)
where P i stands for the steady-state error covariance
defined in (3). For each sensor, we define a random variable
τi(k) ∈ Z as the holding time:
τi(k) , k − max
0≤l≤k
{l : ηi(l) = 1}, (7)
which represents the intervals between the present moment
k and the most recent time when the data packet xˆsi (k)
arrives successfully. Without loss of generality, for all
i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, we assume that the initial packets xˆsi (0)
are received by the estimator, and hence τi(0) = 0.
Note that, the equivalent relationship between the holding
time and the estimation error covariance at the remote
estimator is
Pi(k) = h
τi(k)
i (P i). (8)
Furthermore, the iteration of the holding time is
τi(k + 1) = (1− ηi(k))(τi(k) + 1). (9)
2.4 Problem of Interest
In our work, every sensor competes for public communi-
cation resources to obtain an accurate estimation perfor-
mance, which can be formulated as a game with multiple
self-interested players. Alternatively, it can be modeled
as a constrained game with the consideration of power
limitations. The best response for each player is the NE in
a traditional manner. Differently, in this work we consider
the notion of CE and investigate whether the coordination
(CE) mechanism, compared to the NE, can bring extra
benefits to each player simultaneously.
3. MULTI-SENSOR TRANSMISSION GAME
In this section, we model the interactive decision-making
process of each sensor as a multi-player game and intro-
duce the concept of equilibrium solution.
3.1 Game theoretic framework
The multi-player game, denoted by G, is characterized by
a triplet < I,A,U > where
Players: I = {1, · · · , N} is the set of players, in which
i ∈ I represents sensor i. As a necessary condition for
the equilibrium analysis, we assume that all sensors are
rational; that is, each sensor will make the best decision to
maximize their benefit among all available actions. Also,
the rationality assumption is common knowledge shared
among the players.
Actions: A = {Ai, i ∈ I} illustrates the set of ac-
tions for each player i. For simplicity, we consider the
transmission action sets with discrete energy levels, i.e.,
Ai = {e(1)i , . . . , e(mi)i } for player i. Let ai(k) ∈ Ai denote
the transmission action (or pure strategy) taken by player
i at time k. The mixed strategy for each player, denoted by
si(k) ∈ ∆(Ai), i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, is a probability distribution
over the pure action space Ai. That is, player i, following
strategy profile si(k), may take the transmission power
e
(l)
i , l ∈ {1, . . . ,mi} w.p. si(ai(k) = e(l)i ) 2 at time k. More-
over, define a(k) = {a1(k), a2(k), . . . , aN (k)} as the joint
action played by the overall players. Alternatively, a(k) =
{ai(k),a−i(k)}, in which a−i(k) represents the joint action
excluding player i. Similarly, the joint strategy profiles
are represented by s(k) = {s1(k), s2(k), . . . , sN (k)} =
{si(k), s−i(k)}.
Utility: U = {ui, i ∈ I} is the utility set and ui
represents the utility function for player i with ui :
A → R. As discussed previously, each sensor focuses on
improving its respective estimation accuracy, measured by
the estimation error covariance. Hence, based on (6) the
utility function for player i is characterized by 3
ui(a) , −Tr{E[Pi(k)]} (10)
= −Tr{E[(1− f(γi))P i + f(γi)hτi+1i (P i)]}
= f(γi)ci − Tr{E[P i]},
in which ci , Tr{E[P i − hτi+1i (P i)]} is independent of γi,
and ci < 0 is derived from Lemma 2.1.
Next, we define the expected utility function of player i in
a slight abuse of notation ui(·). Under the joint strategy
profile s, the benefit obtained by player i is
ui(s) ,
∑
a∈A
Pr(a|s)ui(a), (11)
in which Pr(a|s) is the probability over the joint action a
under strategy s.
2 Here, we abuse the notation si(ai(k)) to represent one element of
vector si(k).
3 In the rest of this paper, we will omit the variable k of τi(k), γi(k),
ai(k), si(k) and qi(k) when the underlying time index k is obvious
from the context; otherwise, it will be indicated.
3.2 Equilibrium and Coordination
In our current game, player i is subject to maximize
selfishly its utility at time k, i.e.,
Problem 3.1. For any player i ∈ I,
max
s∈∆(A)
ui(s)
s.t.
∑
ai∈Ai
si(ai) = 1.
Note that the game theory, see Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991), provides a way to cope with these coupled opti-
mization problems. One common solution concept is de-
fined as follows:
Definition 3.2. (Nash Equilibrium). In this multi-player
one-stage game with finite action space, the strategy pro-
file s?,NE = {s?,NE1 , . . . , s?,NEN } is a Nash equilibrium if
no player can benefit from changing strategies while the
others keep their own equilibrium strategy unchanged; i.e.,
for any player i ∈ I,
ui(s = s
?,NE) ≥ ui([si = s, s−i = s?,NE−i ]), ∀s ∈ ∆(Ai).
The respective optimal utility value for each player is
denoted by u?,NEi .
Regarding the non-cooperation among the overall players,
the NE assumes that players choose actions independently,
i.e., Pr(a|s) = ∏i∈I si(ai) in (11). However, it is possible
to extend the sets of strategies available to the players
by allowing them to correlate their choices. Motivated
by that, a more general concept than NE, called the
correlated equilibrium (CE), is proposed. In CE, the
players can receive recommendations on what to play
from an omniscient mediator. To be specific, at time k,
the imagined mediator samples an N -tuple joint action
a = {a1, . . . , aN} as a mode of play w.p. s(a), and the
recommended action for player i is ai = a. Player i may
accept the recommendation or may use a meta-strategy,
denoted by a transition t(ai) : Ai → Ai, when it is
suggested to play ai. At a CE, no such meta-strategy would
improve each player’s expected utility if the others are
assumed to play according to the recommendation. Hence,
we have the following definition.
Definition 3.3. (Correlated Equilibrium). For this game
G, a strategy profile s?,CE is a correlated equilibrium if
and only if∑
a−∈A−i
Pr(a−i = a−|ai = a, s?,CE)
{ui([ai = a,a−i = a−])− ui([t(a),a−i = a−])} ≥ 0,
(12)
for all players, all a ∈ Ai s.t. Pr(ai = a|s?,CE) > 0,
and all transitions t(a) ∈ Ai. We denote by u?,CEi the
corresponding optimal utility value for each player.
The CE concept can deal with some drawbacks of the
original NE concept. One of the advantages of CE is
that it can be computed in polynomial time (via a linear
programming); whereas, the respective complexity for NE
computation (finding its fixed point completely) is known
as an NP-hard problem, see Nisan et al. (2007). More
importantly, at a CE, multiple self-interested players may
achieve higher rewards by coordinating their actions than
they could at an NE. The comparison between NE and CE
is analyzed rigorously in the following section.
4. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the equilibrium solution for
this game under two different cases: with or without
energy constrains. The specific representations and the
comparison between NE and CE are also provided.
4.1 Without Energy Constraints
First, we consider the existence and uniqueness of NE for
Prob. 3.1, and provide the complete NE solution in the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. The multi-player non-cooperative game G
admits a unique NE, which has the property that all
players transmit at its corresponding maximum power
level; i.e.,
s?,NEi (ai) =
{
1, if ai = e
(mi)
i ;
0, others.
∀i ∈ I. (13)
Proof. First, we consider the existence of a pure strategy
NE, denoted by {a?i ,a?−i}. By definition, we have
a?i = arg max
ai∈Ai
ui([ai,a
?
−i])
⇔a?i = arg min
ai
f(γi(ai,a
?
−i)) = arg min
ai
f(
Lai
qˆ?−i + σ2
)
(1)⇔a?i = e(mi)i .
The derivation of (1) is based on that f(·) decreases with
ai. Hence, we obtain a pure strategy NE shown in (13).
Next, we prove the uniqueness of this NE. If there exists
another NE, denoted by s˜?i with s˜
?
i (e
(mi)
i ) < 1,
ui(s˜
?) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
∑
ai∈A
[
∏
j 6=i
s˜?j (aj)]s˜
?
i (ai)ui([ai,a−i])
<
∑
a−i∈A−i
∑
ai∈A
[
∏
j 6=i
s˜?j (aj)]s˜
?
i (ai)ui([e
(mi)
i ,a−i])
=
∑
a−i∈A−i
[
∏
j 6=i
s˜?j (aj)]ui([e
(mi)
i ,a−i]) = ui([s
?
i , s˜
?
−i]).
This shows that player i tends to adopt s?i if the others
keep their strategy unchanged, which contradicts the NE
concept. Hence, s?,NEi is unique. 
Recall that, a CE is a joint distribution over actions from
which no agent is motivated to deviate unilaterally. The
following theorem demonstrates the uniqueness of the CE
solution, and captures the relationship between CE and
NE for the game G.
Theorem 4.2. The multi-player game G has a unique CE,
denoted by s?,CE , and it is equivalent to the NE.
Proof. From the definition of CE and conditional proba-
bility, we have∑
a−i
s?,CE(a)[ui(a)− ui([t(ai),a−i])] ≥ 0, ∀ai, t(ai) ∈ Ai,
(14)
in which s?,CE(a) is the probability over joint action set
a following the CE strategy profile, and t(·) is a mapping
from Ai to Ai. Next, we will interpret the computation of
s?,CE based on (14).
For player 1, if a1 = e
(1)
1 , then at a CE, for all a1, t(a1) ∈A1 the following inequality holds:∑
a−i
s?,CE([e
(1)
1 ,a−1])[u1([e
(1)
1 ,a−1])−ui([t(e(1)1 ),a−1])] ≥ 0.
Based on property (1) in the Appendix, we have u1([e
(1)
1 ,a−1]) <
u1([t(e
(1)
1 ),a−1]), ∀a−1 ∈ A−1 and t(a1) 6= a1. There-
fore, s?,CE([e
(1)
1 ,a−1]) = 0,∀a−1 ∈ A−1. Analogously, we
can obtain that s?,CE([e
(1)
i ,a−i]) = 0,∀a−i ∈ A−i,∀i ∈{1, · · · , N}. That is, all players will choose their smallest
power level e
(1)
i w.p. 0, no matter what strategies the
others take.
Here, we construct a game G′ with the action space exclud-
ing the lowest power levels, i.e.,A′i = {e(2)i , · · · , e(mi)i },∀i ∈I. Obviously, the CE problem of the original game G is
converted into that of the game G′. Let s′?,CE denote
the CE of G′. Similar to the aforementioned analysis,
we can obtain s′?,CE([e(2)i ,a−i]) = 0,∀a−i ∈ A′−i and∀i ∈ I. Consequently, the CE of the original game G can
be computed easily by recursive analysis:
s?,CE(a) =
{
1, if a = {e(m1)1 , . . . , e(mN )N }.
0, others.
(15)
By comparing (13) and (15), the equivalence between the
CE and NE is proved. 
4.2 With Energy Constraint
As discussed previously, the optimal response for each
player is to transmit the estimation packet constantly at
its maximum power level. Nevertheless, such inefficient
situation is less achievable, especially in a practical CPS,
as the energy for sensor transmission is restricted. Here,
we provide different constraints on the expected power
consumption for each sensor, and provide the constrained
game as follows:
Problem 4.3. For each player i ∈ I,
max
s∈∆(A)
ui(s)
s.t.
∑
a∈A
s(a) = 1,
E[ai|si] =
∑
ai∈Ai
si(ai)ai ≤ emaxi . (16)
Moreover, a strict power constraint is considered: e
(1)
i <
emaxi < e
(mi)
i .
For the NE solution, we have the following result.
Theorem 4.4. The constrained game (i.e., Prob. 4.3) has a
unique mixed strategy NE with its specific representation
given in (20).
Proof. Let s?,NE = {s?,NE1 , . . . , s?,NEN } denote the op-
timal strategy profile. For player i, given the optimal
strategies of others s?,NE−i , we have
ui(s
?,NE
i , s
?,NE
−i ) = max
si∈∆(Ai)
ui(si, s
?,NE
−i )
= max
si
mi∑
l=1
si(ai = e
(l)
i )u
(l)
i , (17)
in which
u
(l)
i , ui(ai = e
(l)
i , s
?
−i) (18)
=
∑
a−∈A−i
N∏
j=1,j 6=i
s?j (aj)ui(ai = e
(l)
i ,a
−)
<
∑
a−∈A−i
N∏
j=1,j 6=i
s?j (aj)ui(ai = e
(l′)
i ,a
−)
= u
(l′)
i ,
and in which l′ ∈ {l + 1, . . . ,mi}.
Note that maximum utility is achieved when the equality
in (16) holds. Next, we rewrite the energy constraint in
(16) by replacing si(e
(1)
i ) with 1 −
∑mi
l=2 si(e
(l)
i ). We can
obtain that
mi∑
l=2
dlsi(e
(l)
i ) = 1,
in which dl , e
(l)
i
−e(1)
i
emax
i
−e(1)
i
> 0,∀l ∈ {2, . . . ,mi} is a constant,
and
max
si
ui(si, s
?,NE
−i ) (19)
= max
si
u
(1)
i +
mi∑
l=2
u
(l)
i − u(1)i
dl
· [dlsi(e(l)i )].
According to property (2) in the Appendix, we have
0 <
u
(l)
i − u(1)i
dl
<
u
(l′)
i − u(1)i
dl′
in which l′ ∈ {l + 1, . . . ,mi}. Apparently, the optimal
solution is obtained when dmisi(e
(mi)
i ) = 1, and the
formulation of NE for this constrained game is: for all
players,
s?,NEi (ai) =

(dmi)
−1 = e
max
i −e(1)i
e
(mi)
i
−e(1)
i
, if ai = e
(mi)
i ,
1− (dmi)−1 = e
(mi)
i
−emaxi
e
(mi)
i
−e(1)
i
, if ai = e
(1)
i ,
0, others.
(20)
The uniqueness of the NE is guaranteed by the optimal
solution of (19). 
Note that at the NE, each player transmits the data packet
with the highest or lowest energy power, regardless of the
middle levels. Motivated by this, we propose the following
mechanism.
Definition 4.5. We define the set of correlation policies as
follows:
• Assume at each time k, all sensors can observe a signal
in the form of a random variable X(k), uniformly
distributed over the integers {1, . . . , N}.
• A correlated strategy of sensor i is described by two
numbers: αi ∈ [0, 1] and βi ∈ [0, 1].
• At time k, if X(k) = i, then sensor i is chosen to
transmit a packet at the highest power e
(mi)
i w.p. αi
and at the lowest power e
(1)
i w.p. (1−αi). Otherwise
it transmits w.p. βi for the highest power e
(mi)
i and
w.p. (1− βi) for the lowest.
Next, we interpret the computation of the CE under this
correlated policy. To simplify the calculation and obtain
a closed-form formula of the CE, we assume that dmi =
dmj ,∀i 6= j for this constrained game. Recall that, the
CE concept, compared with the ordinary NE, can simul-
taneously improve the benefit of each player under this
competitive environment. The following theorem captures
this and provides a complete representation of the CE.
Theorem 4.6. This constrained game with dmi = d, ∀i ∈I, admits the existence of a CE under the correlation
policy proposed in Def. 4.5. The corresponding parameter
is illustrated by (21). Moreover, the CE outcome of this
game is superior to the NE outcome for each player i ∈ I.
Proof. First, we discuss the expected utility for player i
under this policy. By definition, if X(k) = i, then
si(ai) = 1{e(mi)
i
}(ai)αi + 1{e(1)i }
(ai)(1− αi),
and for j 6= i
sj(aj) = 1{e(mj)
j
}(aj)βj + 1{e(1)j }
(aj)(1− βj).
The expected utility for the sensor i is:
ui(s) = αiui([e
(mi)
i , sl, s−i−l]) + (1− αi)ui([e(1)i , sl, s−i−l]),
in which l 6= j, and the definition of ui([ai, sl, s−i−l]) is
similar to (18).
Analogously, if X(k) = l, the expected utility for sensor i
is:
ui(s
′) = βiui([e
(mi)
i , s
′
l, s−i−l]) + (1− βi)ui([e(1)i , s′l, s−i−l]),
in which
s′l(al) = 1{e(ml)
l
}(al)αl + 1{e(1)l }
(al)(1− αl).
Next, we consider the computation of the CE. Solving the
constrained optimization problem, as well as finding the
CE, becomes rapidly intractable when the number of play-
ers N increases. Here, we can restrict to the same strategy
(α?, β?) being adopted by all players, and investigate if
a single player deviating from this strategy by using a
different strategy (α, β).
If X(k) = i and player i adopts a meta-strategy charac-
terized by α, then it obtains the benefit
Uα =
∑
a−i−l
Pr(a−i−l|α?, β?)
[
αβ?um,mi + α(1− β?)um,1i
+ (1− α)β?u1,mi + (1− α)(1− β?)u1,1i
]
,
in which, for example, um,mi , ui([e
(mi)
i , e
(ml)
l ,a−i−l]) and
u1,1i , ui([e
(1)
i , e
(1)
l ,a−i−l]). If X(k) = l and β is used by
player i, then its utility is
Uβ =
∑
a−i−l
Pr(a−i−l|α?, β?)
[
βα?um,mi + β(1− α?)um,1i
+ (1− β)α?u1,mi + (1− β)(1− α?)u1,1i
]
.
Then, the expected utility of player i by adopting (α, β) is
Table 1. System Parameters
Process parameters Channel parameters
Process 1 A1 0.9 C1 1 e
(m1)
1 1 e
max
1 0.5
Process 2 A2 0.8 C2 1.1 e
(m2)
2 0.8 e
max
2 0.4
Process 3 A3 0.7 C3 1.2 e
(m3)
3 0.6 e
max
3 0.3
ui(α, β) =
Uα + (N − 1)Uβ
N
(1)
=
∑
a−i−l
Pr(a−i−l|α?, β?)N − 1
N
(α? − β?)uˆβ + c′,
in which uˆ = um,mi − um,1i − u1,mi + u1,1i < 0 is based on
property (3) in the Appendix, and c′ is a constant. The
equality (1) is derived by replacing α with the expression
Nd−1 − (N − 1)β (obtained by the energy constraint).
Hence, ui(α, β) is an affine function in β, and the optimal
β is
β? =
{
max(0, Nd
−1−1
N−1 ), If α
? > β?;
min(1, Nd
−1
N−1 ), If α
? < β?.
(21)
Last, we compare the CE outcome with that of the
NE. The NE is a special case of the CE, that is α? =
β? = s. From the previous discussion, we know that
arg maxβ ui(α, β) = β
? 6= s. Hence, we have the payoff
of the CE strictly greater than the payoff of the NE. 
Remark 1. In the absent of energy limitations, the best
response for each sensor is transmitting with the maximum
energy level, no matter what equilibrium it chooses. The
result is of common sense since the players’ utilities do
not involve the power expenditure items. However, when
taking the power restrictions into account, the correlation
mechanism displays its advantages over the NE. Intu-
itively, in NE every player will take full advantage of
their transmission power, which inevitably causes heavy
communication conflicts. But, the existence of mediator
in CE can coordinate the players’ behaviors to alliterate
these conflicts and achieve better performance.
5. SIMULATION AND EXAMPLES
In this section, we will compare the NE outcome and
the CE outcome of the game-theoretic model using an
example. Here, we consider a multi-agent system with
three sensors and one remote estimator. The monitored
dynamic processes have respective system parameters,
demonstrated in Tab. 1. In addition, the error covariances
of the Gaussian noises are Qi = Ri = 0.8,∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Some parameters of the communication channel are given
in Tab. 1. Moreover, e
(1)
i = 0 (note that each sensor
may choose to stay inactive), hi = 1,∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
L = 2. For the SER, we adopt the formula: f(γ) = 1 −
2Q(
√
4γ−1 − 1), where Q(x) , 1√
2pi
∫∞
x
exp(−y22 ) dy.
By Theorem. 4.4 and Theorem. 4.6, we can obtain the
following two strategy profiles for the sensor to transmit
data packets:
• sNE : si(0) = si(e(mi)i ) = 0.5, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
• sCE : si(e(mi)i ) =
{
0.75, if sensor i is chosen;
0.25, others.
and
si(0) = 1− si(e(mi)i ).
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Fig. 2. Comparison between sNE and sCE for sensors 1
and 2.
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Fig. 3. Performance difference between sNE and sCE for
sensor 3.
Via 100, 000 Monte Carlo simulations, the comparison
(between sNE and sCE) results of state estimation error
covariance for sensors 1 and 2 are depicted in Fig. 2.
Furthermore, we represent the performance difference of
sensor 3 in Fig. 3. All comparison results illustrate the
analytical performance in Theorem. 4.6 and highlight the
superiority of the proposed coordination mechanism. Last,
but not least, comparing Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, the performance
difference between the NE and the CE decreases as the
energy constraint becomes stronger.
6. CONCLUSION
We have investigated the remote estimation issue for a
multi-sensor system under the game-theoretic framework.
Motivated by the concept of Nash equilibrium in the
previous work, we analyzed the performance advantage
brought by the correlation policy. In the absence of power
constraints, the correlated equilibrium outcome is equal to
the NE outcome. However, the correlated policy improves
the estimation performance in the presence of power
constraints.
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Appendix A. PROPERTIES OF THE UTILITY
FUNCTION
Consider the utility function ui(ai,a−i),∀i ∈ {1, · · · , N},
defined in (10). We can obtain the following properties:
(1) ∂ui(ai,a−i)∂ai > 0 if ai > 0.
(2) If a2 > a1 > a0 > 0, then
wa0(ai = a2) > wa0(ai = a1),
in which wa0(ai) ,
ui(ai,a−i)−ui(ai=a0,a−i)
ai−a0 and a−i is
given.
(3) If a2 > a1 > 0 and a4 > a3 > 0 then
ui(a2, a4,a−i−l)− ui(a2, a3, ·)
− ui(a1, a4, ·) + ui(a1, a3, ·) < 0,
where a−i−l is given.
Proof.
(1) The first statement can be obtained from ci < 0 and
∂ui(ai,a−i)
∂ai
= cif
′(γi)
γi
ai
.
(2) Since f ′′(γi) < 0, then
∂2ui(ai,a−i)
∂a2i
= cif
′′(γi)(
γi
ai
)2 > 0.
Hence, ui(ai,a−i) is an increasing and strictly convex
function in ai. Obviously, we can obtain that if a2 >
a1 > a0 > 0, then
wa0(a2) > wa0(a1).
(3) Consider the second partial derivative of function
ui(·),
∂2ui(ai, ala−i−l)
∂ai∂al
=
−cihlγ2i
hiLa2i
[f ′(γi) + γif ′′(γi)] < 0.
Hence, we have
ui(a2, a4, ·)− ui(a1, a4)
a2 − a1 <
ui(a2, a3, ·)− ui(a1, a3)
a2 − a1
Obviously, the statement (3) holds. 
